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Eastlake and Arlington Heights:
New Hurdles in Regulating Urban
Land Use?
L. Lynn Hogue*
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc. and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., will directly affect the ability of lawyers to bring about
housing reform for the urban poor. In his analysis, ProfessorHoguefinds that
the combined effect of these two cases is to restrict the availability of federal
constitutional remedies to invalidate discriminatoryland use regulations enacted by municipalities.Asa result, the authorconcludesthat greateruse will be
made by developing state constitutionalclaims and statutory remedies by those
challengingexclusionary housingpatterns.
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Eastlake and Arlington Heights:
New Hurdles in Regulating Urban
Land Use?
Zoning provisions such as that in Eastlake's charter have a single
motive, and that is to exclude, to build walls against the ills, poverty, racial strife, and the people themselves, of our urban areas.
The struggles of our suburbs to build such walls can be seen in cases
throughout the county.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

THOSE WHO

CONCERN THEMSELVES with land use regulation,
particularly in the urban setting, have good reason to be concerned
about two of the Supreme Court's more recent efforts in this area: 2 City
of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,Inc. 3 and Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.4 Together the
two cases portend the serious possibility of increased neighborhood
segregation based on race and wealth coupled with greater difficulties
in subjecting such discrimination to judicial scrutiny.
This disturbing portent is an apparent setback in the fight against
exclusionary zoning. 5 Sadder still, it marks a notable departure from
what was emerging as a fairly clear pattern of judicial sympathy
toward the plight of the urban poor. This now-broken trend was
evident in such cases as Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment
1. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 200, 324
N.E.2d 740, 749 (1975) (Stern, J., concurring), rev'd and remanded, 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
See also KERNER COMMISSION'S REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 118-20 (1968).
2. For a criticism of recent Supreme Court decisions prior to Eastlake (e.g., Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)), see
I N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 5.05, at
110-11 (1974); 3 N. WILLIAMS, supra, at § 66.34.
3. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
4. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
5. See D. MOSKOWITZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION (1977). Both Arlington
Heights and Eastlake were pending at the time Moskowitz's treatise went to press, id. at
86 n. 17, and before the United States Supreme Court first undercut and then reversed
the Arlington Heights decision by the Seventh Circuit, 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. III. 1974),
rev'd, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd and remanded, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See text
accompanying note 141 infra. For a discussion of the district and appellate level decisions, see D. MOSKOWITZ, supra at 115-21. See also Perry, The DisproportionateImpact
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 582-89 (1977).
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Agency,6 which involved a successful challenge to a city's failure to
provide adequate alternative housing opportunities for low income
minorities displaced by urban renewal; Kennedy ParkHomes Association v. City of Lackawanna,' in which plaintiffs succeeded in attacking
a city's refusal to permit the construction of a low income housing
project; Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organizationv. City of
Union City,8 which upheld a California referendum provision by
which a housing project for low-and-moderate income families had
been stymied, but nevertheless contained dicta suggesting that a
violation of equal protection could be inferred from the effect of
segregation;9 United States v. City of Black Jack, I" which invalidated
an effort to frustrate construction of low income housing by zoning out
multi-family dwellings; and Hills v. Gautreaux,11 which permitted a
remedial court order to go beyond city boundaries and include the
entire relevant metropolitan-area housing market.
Some of the gains for decent housing opportunities marked off in
these cases have been lost in Arlington Heights, whose effects will be
exacerbated by Eastlake. It is the purpose of this article to analyze the
impact of these two cases on urban housing and land use, as well as to
assess the tactics remaining in the arsenal of housing rights litigators.
This analysis begins with Eastlake because it invites a brief historical
treatment of both prior federal constitutional zoning law and relevant
state law considerations.
II.

EASTLAKE AND ITS BACKGROUND

In Eastlake, the Supreme Court had before it a challenge to the
provision of a city charter that permitted the voters of the city to
12
approve by a 55 percent majority any alteration in existing land uses.
As a property owner who had sought a zoning change, Forest City
6. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
7. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
8. 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).

9. Id. at 295-96.
10. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying note 235 infra.

11. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
12. As adopted by the voters, Art. VIII, § 3, of the Eastlake City Charter provides in

pertinent part:
That any change to the existing land uses or any change whatsoever to any

ordinance. . . cannot be approved unless and until it shall have been submitted
to the Planning Commission, for approval or disapproval. That in the event the
city council should approve any of the preceeding changes, or enactments,
whether approved or disapproved by the Planning Commission it shall not be
approved or passed by the declaration of an emergency, and it shall not be
effective, but it shall be mandatory that the same be approved by a 55%
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Enterprises, Inc. alleged that the referendum requirement denied it due
process of law under the fourteenth amendment because it was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the people. 13 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld the referendum
provision. The High Court reasoned that a referendum involving the
entire municipality "cannot . . . be characterized as a delegation of
5
power," 14 so that the delegation doctrine' did not apply to the case. 16
favorable vote of all votes cast of the qualified electors of the City of Eastlake
at the next regular municipal election, if one shall occur not less than sixty (60)
or more than one hundred and twenty (120) days after its passage, otherwise at
a special election falling on the generally established day of the primary election.
Referendum provisions are authorized by Article II, § l(f) of the Ohio Constitution
which provides:
The initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of
each municipality on all questions which such municipalities may now or
hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action; such powers
shall be exercised in the manner now or hereafter provided by law.
This constitutional provision had earlier been interpreted to limit the use of local
referenda to questions within the legislative power of municipalities. Myers v. Schiering, 27 Ohio St. 2d 11, 271 N.E.2d 864 (1971). Thus, even though Eastlake's city charter
covered "any change to the existing land uses," its force was limited to zoning ordinances recommended by the planning commission and approved by the city council in its
legislative capacity. As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court:
On its face, the charter provision makes no distinction between those changes
made by council in an administrative capacity, and those made by council in a
legislative capacity. Thus, the requirement of a mandatory referendum falls
upon all changes with equal weight. Insofar as this purports to mandate a
referendum as to an administrative determination, it is clearly invalid.
41 Ohio St. 2d at 191, 324 N.E.2d at 744 (citation omitted).
The Federal Supreme Court majority apparently read this construction to mean that
hardship occasioned by referenda might be alleviated by administrative action, which
remained immune from plebiscite review:
[T]he Ohio Supreme Court concluded that only land use changes granted by the
City Council when acting in a legislative capacity were subject to the referendum process. Under the court's binding interpretation of state law, a property
owner seeking relief from unnecessary hardship occasioned by zoning restrictions would not be subject to Eastlake's referendum procedure. For example, if
unforeseeable future changes give rise to hardship on the owner, the holding of
the Ohio Supreme Court provides avenues of administrative relief not subject
to the referendum process.
426 U.S. at 674 n.9. Reliance on the "escape valve" of administrative action to alleviate
the individual hardships left by this decision is shortsighted. It ignores the substantial
procedural and practical problems which remain. See notes 68-109 infra and accompanying text.
13. See 426 U.S. at 671.
14. Id. at 672.
15. Courts have frequently held in other [i.e., federal] contexts that a congressional delegation of power to a regulatory entity must be accompanied by
discernable standards, so that the delegatee's action can be measured for its
fidelity to the legislative will. . . . Assuming, arguendo, their relevance to
state governmental functions, these cases involved a delegation of power by the
legislature to regulatory bodies, which are not directly responsible to the peo-
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Instead, the city's referendum met. procedural due process requirements simply because it was "a means for direct political participation, allowing the people the final decision, amounting to a veto
power, over enactments of representative bodies."'17 Although disappointed property owners may still challenge zoning results, they may
not contest the procedure. In challenging such results, the Court
reaffirmed that in the usual case1 8 the appropriate constitutional test is
the one announced in the landmark zoning case of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. :19 "Under Euclid, a property owner can challenge
a zoning restriction if the measure is 'clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare.' "20
The Court's approval of plebiscite 2 ' zoning in Eastlake raises a
number of important questions relating to land use controls. In their
simplest form, these concern the extent of land use regulation by
private citizens permitted under the federal Constitution, the problem
of spot zoning, 22 and the mechanics of "due process" as meted out in
the election forum (or the problem of "procedural fairness" suggested
by two of the dissenting Justices in Eastlake, Brennan and Stevens).2 3
Not all of these problems were fully examined in the course of
pie; this doctrine is inapplicable where, as here, rather than a delegation of
power, we deal with a power reserved by the people to themselves.

Id. at 675 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
16. Id.

17. Id.at 673.
18. The Court does note, however, that where specific constitutional limitations are
offended, a zoning result would be subject to a different standard of review. Id. at 676

(quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969) (equal protection challenge to
referendum zoning provision which treated racial matters differently than all others)).
However, after Arlington Heights, the equal protection standard has become more
difficult. See sections VII and VIII infra.
19. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
20. Id. at 395, quoted in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S.
at 676.
21. The term "plebiscite" is used throughout this article notwithstanding the fact
that technically it may not apply to the situation in Eastlake where a referendum was
held on a measure already approved by the town's legislative body. A plebiscite, in its
most limited sense, contrasts with a referendum in that it is a vote on a measure
originally submitted to the people and not a vote to approve the legislative act of another
body. WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1739 (3d ed. 1961). It is intended that all
forms of popular legislating, including initiative, plebiscite and referendum, be encompassed within the term plebiscite.
22. Mr. Justice Powell noted this difficulty in his one-paragraph dissenting opinion.
426 U.S. at 680.
23. Id.
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Forest City Enterprises' effort to have its land rezoned. 24 In Eastlake,
a development corporation acquired an eight-acre parcel zoned for
light industrial use and applied for a zoning change to permit construction of a multi-family, high-rise apartment building. Both the city's
planning commission and the city council approved the rezoning. In
the meantime, however, the voters of Eastlake, Ohio, amended the
city charter to require a referendum on any changes in land use
approved by the council.25
When Forest City returned to the planning commission to seek a
further variance for "parking and yard" approval, it was rejected since
the now-required referendum on the original rezoning had not yet been
held. Forest City then sought a declaratory judgment that the charter
26
amendment was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Both the Court of Common Pleas and the Ohio Court of Appeals
upheld the charter amendment, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed.
A. An HistoricalLook at Land Use Controls
In its reversal, the Ohio Supreme Court relied on a trilogy of early
cases: Eubank v. City of RichmondY Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of
Chicago,28 and Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v.
Roberge. 29 On at least one level, the difference in outcome between
the Ohio and federal Supreme Courts can be attributed, in part, to their
respective views of the meaning of these three cases. Whether Eastlake, in construing these cases, has clarified that earlier law is questionable.
24. Indeed the Supreme Court emphasized the narrow scope of its review: "The
Supreme Court of Ohio rested its decision solely on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . ..The only questions presented to this Court in the petition

for certiorari concern the validity of that due process holding. Pet. for Cert. 2."
Id. at 677 n.ll.
25. See note 12 supra.

26. See 41 Ohio St. 2d at 187-88, 324 N.E.2d at 742. In its original complaint, the
plaintiff also sought an injunction to bar the board of elections from holding the

referendum. See Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Zoning Referenda-MandatoryReferenda
on All MunicipalLand Uses Do Not Violate the Due Process Clause, 5 FORDHAM J. URB.
L. 141, 142 n.8 (1976). This resembles the pattern in Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529,
535, 413 P.2d 825, 829, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 885 (1966) ("Prior to its enactment the
unconstitutionality of Proposition 14 was urged to this court in Lewis v. Jordan. . . .In
rejecting the petition for mandamus to keep that proposition off the ballot we stated in
our minute order 'that it would be more appropriate to pass on those questions after the
election . . . than to interfere with the power of the people to propose laws and
amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject the same at the polls.' "). See also
Seeley, The PublicReferendum andMinority Group Legislation:Postscriptto Reitman v.
Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 881, 886 & n.26 (1970).
27. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
28. 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
29. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
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Both Eubank and Roberge involved ordinances imposing land use
restrictions that were invalidated by the federal Supreme Court on
constitutional grounds. In Cusack, an ordinance restricting billboards
was upheld. A common consideration in all three cases was the degree
to which adjoining property owners are permitted to regulate their
neighbor's use of his land.
The ordinance attacked in Eubank permitted building lines to be
established that defined a portion of the landowner's property between
the street and the line that was to remain free of building encroachments. The decision as to whether or not a building line was to be
drawn was determined by two-thirds of the property owners whose
land abutted a given street. Once these landowners submitted a written
request, the city's street committee was to set the line at between five
and thirty feet back from the street. Thereafter, building permits would
issue only for construction that did not cross the line, and a fine was
provided for violation of the ordinance. Eubank constructed a house
with a bay window that obtruded beyond the building line into the
proscribed space, and he attacked the imposition of a fine for the
violation.
The Supreme Court, per Justice McKenna, held that the ordinance
was unconstitutional. The Court found the regulation to be an unlawful
delegation of legislative power in that "while conferring the power on
some property holders to virtually control and dispose of the proper
rights of others, [it] creates no standard by which the power thus given
is to be exercised ... 30
In Cusack,'the Supreme Court was confronted with an ordinance
that prohibited billboards of a certain size in residential areas unless a
majority of the affected owners consented to their construction. This
requirement was attacked as an improper delegation of legislative
power to a majority of the owners of property fronting on the proposed
billboard site.
In an opinion by Justice Clarke, the Court held that since billboards
were prohibited outright, Cusack, the plaintiff in error, could only be
benefited by the procedure. Billboards, the Court reasoned, were
"offensive structures" and suitable for such draconian treatment.
Eubank, on which plaintiff Cusack had sought to rely, was distinguished as follows:
The former [ordinance in Eubank] left the establishment of
the building line untouched until the lot owners should act and
then made the street committee the mere automatic register of
that action and gave to it the effect of law. The ordinance in
30. 226 U.S. at 143-44.
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the case at bar absolutely prohibits the erection of any billboards in the blocks designated, but permits this prohibition
to be modified with the consent of the persons who are to be
most affected by such modification. The one ordinance permits two-thirds of the lot owners to impose restrictions upon
the other property in the block, while the other permits onehalf of the lot owners to remove a restriction from the other
property owners. This is not a delegation of legislative power,
but is, as we have seen, a familiar 3provision affecting the
enforcement of laws and ordinances. 1
Justice McKenna dissented.
These cases were followed by Roberge which involved a comprehensive Seattle zoning ordinance uniformly prohibiting certain
types of buildings in districts dedicated to restricted uses. The ordinance in Roberge permitted "a philanthropic home . . . for old

people"-an otherwise proscribed use-upon the written consent "of
the owners of two-thirds of the property within four hundred (400) feet
of the proposed building." Without complying with the written consent requirement, a trustee for a charity that desired to construct a
geriatric home challenged the ordinance as an improper delegation of
legislative power. The Supreme Court agreed:
The section purports to give the owners of less than one-half
the land within 400 feet of the proposed building authorityuncontrolled by any standard or rule prescribed by legislative
action-to prevent the trustee from using its land for the
proposed home. .

.

. The delegation of power so attempted

is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2
Cusack was distinguished on the grounds that it involved a nuisance: "The facts shown clearly distinguish the proposed building and
use from such billboards or other uses which by reason of their nature
33
are liable to be offensive."
B.

Construction Problems: Eubank, Cusack, and Roberge

On their faces, the ordinances in Cusack and Roberge operated in
like fashion: a given use of property was forbidden, until permission
was secured from adjoining, affected landowners. Yet this apparent
similarity, stressed in Cusack,34 was given short shrift in Roberge.
31. 242 U.S. at 531.
32. 278 U.S. at 121-22.
33.

Id. at 122.

34. See note 23 supra.
35. See Jaffe, Law Making By Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 228 n.67
(1937). The problem, of course, is that though commentators like Jaffe long ago con-
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Instead, the Court relied on a factual distinction between billboards
and old folks' homes bottomed on nuisance characteristics. Professor
Jaffe offered an interesting analysis of the problem:
Commentators find it difficult to reconcile these decisions of
the Supreme Court and suggest that the Roberge case probably overrules the Cusack case. Whether that is so, we
cannot say; it does not purport to do so. It may be said that in
the setback and poorhouse cases, property owners would be
moved almost entirely by cupidity: the prohibited conditions
had none of the qualities of a common-law nuisance. The
billboard because of its assumed function of sheltering immorality, is at least in the doubtful class; judgment conceivably may be based on more disinterested, or at least broader,
grounds. Possibly, this distinction limps but the Cusack case
is still of importance because it demonstrates in itself that a
delegation to private parties is not necessarily a violation of
federal due process.36
Concededly, encroaching into territory marked off by a set-back
line or building a home for the aged do not usually create nuisances,
but they often call forth problems that have nuisance characteristics.
For example, set-back restrictions can prevent wooden houses from
being built too close together and creating a fire hazard, 37 or prevent
cluded that the distinction was without vitality, courts continued to rely on it. E.g., "In
Eubank, a reasonable use of property was prohibited by arbitrary fiat; in Cusack, an
unreasonable use of property was prohibited by valid legislative action, subject to said
prohibition's being lifted by those affected." 41 Ohio St. 2d at 193, 324 N.E.2d at 745.
See also, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,6-7 (1974). Even more troubling is
the following footnote in the Federal Supreme Court's majority opinion in Eastlake
which purports to interpret Cusack:
In contrast to Eubank and Roberge, the Cusack Court upheld a neighborhood
consent provision which permitted property owners to waive a municipal restriction prohibiting the construction of billboards ...
Since the property owners could simply waive an otherwise applicable
legislative limitation, the Court in Cusack determined that the provision did not
delegate legislative power at all.
426 U.S. at 677 n.12 (emphasis in original).
The problem with this explanation is that the Roberge ordinance, which was held
unconstitutional, also operated on a waiver principle. However, given that Cusack still
has some vitality, perhaps Jaffe is correct in saying that "the Cusack case is still of
importance because it demonstrates in itself that a delegation to private parties is not
necessarily a violation of federal due process." Jaffe, supra at 228. Indeed, under the
Supreme Court's apparent theory that property owners could waive legislative limitations, could not the referendum procedure in Eastlake be upheld simply on the grounds
that it did not involve a delegation because it in effect allowed a "waiver" of the "light
industrial" restriction placed on the property by the comprehensive zoning plan if the
voters, by a requisite majority, acquiesced in the rezoning? Note that both zoning and
rezoning are subject to referendum in Ohio. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 189-90, 324 N.E.2d at 743
(citing Hilltop Realty v. City of S. Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 164 N.E.2d 180 (1960)).
36. Jaffe, supra note 35, at 228.
37. 7 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.541 (3d ed. 1968) (citing Town
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crowding and thus assure the maintenance of an adequate right-ofway 38 as well as preserving the city's option to widen streets without
undue difficulty. 39 Homes for the aged are not an unmixed blessing,
and they can clearly be seen as inconsistent with the use of an area for
residential homes dedicated to single-family dwellings. The trustee in
Roberge proposed to replace a former private residence that would
accomodate "about fourteen guests" with a building that would house
thirty. Neighbors might understandably object to this change because
of the probability of increased traffic and noise, for example. If these
are not nuisance-based considerations, at least they approach them.
Furthermore, the principal objection to billboards is probably aesthetic. 4° Their characterization as shelters for immorality is probably
makeweight.4 1
The language of Roberge itself provides little additional help in
reconciling the cases. The opinion urged somewhat inconsistently that
the exclusion of the old folks' home "is not indispensable to the
general zoning plan" and reasoned that this can be inferred from the
provision for constructing the home if adjacent owners approve:
The grant of permission for such building and use, although
purporting to be subject to such consents, shows that the
legislative body found that the construction and maintenance
of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 111 A. 354 (1920); City of Miami v. Romer, 58
So.2d 849 (Fla. 1952); Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 214 A.2d 775 (1965)).
38. See Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. at 364-65, 111 A. at 356 ("Streets
• . . of suitable width help transportation, add to the safety of travel, furnish better
protection against fire, and better light and air to those who live upon the streets. They
afford better opportunities for laying, maintaining and inspecting water, sewer, gas and
heating pipes, and electric and telephone conduits in the streets.")
39. E.g., Vangellow v. City of Rochester, 190 Misc. 128, 71 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1947).
40. E.g., State v. Whitlock, 149 N.C. 542, 63 S.E. 123 (1908). See 7 E. McQuILLIN,
supra note 37, at § 24.382.
41. McQuillin lists four additional reasons for legitimately banning billboards under
the police power: "(1) billboards being temporary structures are liable to be blown down
and thus injure pedestrians; (2) they gather refuse and paper which may tend to spread
conflagrations; (3) they are used as dumping places for dirt, filth, and refuse, and as
public privies; (4) they serve as hiding places for criminals." 7 E. MCQuILLIN supra note
37, at § 24.380 (citations omitted). These are not particularly pursuasive in the Cusack
context since none of these asserted bases, if true, should be an appropriate subject for
waiver. The most applicable basis for regulating billboards would seem to be to avoid
interference with drivers, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App.
47, 199 N.W.2d 525 (1972), or perhaps to avoid distracting drivers, see Variety Theaters,
Inc. v. Cleveland County, 282 N.C. 272, 192 S.E.2d 290 (1972) (a ban against drive-in
theaters), which rest on the police power authority to regulate traffic. See also Comment, Planningand Aesthetic Zoning-GettingMore Out of What We've Got, 52 J. URB.
L. 1033, 1055-57 (1975).
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of the new home was in harmony with the public interest and
with the general scope and plan of the zoning ordinance.42
But for the assumed existence of a nuisance in Cusack, this logic
could, of course, apply to billboards as well. How this differs from the
argument that providing for billboards subject to the neighbors' approval implies a finding by the city that they are free from the stigma of
nuisance is difficult to grasp. Indeed, not all courts agree 43 that billboards and the like are nuisances. 44
Given the difficulty in reconciling this trilogy of cases, and yet
considering the reasoning in Roberge, it is not surprising that the Ohio
Supreme Court concluded that standardless delegation was the central
element in understanding the cases:
The distinction to be drawn between the court's decisions in
Eubank and Roberge, on the one hand, and.

. .

inCusack,

on the other, is this: A reasonable use of property, made
possible by appropriate legislative action, may not be made
dependent upon the potentially arbitrary and unreasonable
whims of the voting public.

Not so, said the Federal Supreme Court:
The thread common to both.

.

.[Eubank and Roberge] is the

delegation of legislative power, originally given by the people
to a legislative body, and in turn delegated by the legislature
to a narrow segment of the community, not to the people at
large ....
• . .[T]he standardless delegation of power to a limited
group of property owners condemned by the Court in Eubank
by the
and Roberge is not to be equated with decisionmaking
46
people through the referendum process.
Cusack was distinguished from Roberge because the waiver in the
former case involved the participation of "the persons who are to be
most affected.

.

.

. "7 In this way, the EastIlake Court found that the

waiver in Cusack did not involve a delegation at all. 48 This interpreta42. 278 U.S. at 121.
43. State v. Whitlock, 149 N.C. 542, 63 S.E. 123 (1908). "[A] secure structure upon

private property, and one which is not per se an infringement upon the public safety, and
is not a nuisance, cannot be made one by legislative fiat and then prohibited." Id.

at 543-44, 63 S.E. at 123 (citations omitted).
44. Most courts, however, have found billboards to be nuisances. E.g., Bryan v.
Chester, 212 Pa. St. 259, 61 A. 894 (1905). See also 7 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 37, at

330.
45. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 195, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
46. 426 U.S. at 677-78 (emphasis in original).
47. Id. at 677-78 n.12 (quoting Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. at
531).

48. Id.
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tion of the Eubank-Cusack-Roberge trilogy apparently blurs several
distinct questions: (1) Is the problem addressed by the trilogy the
delegation of legislative4 9 power to any limited group ("narrow segment") of persons rather than to the citizenry as a whole (i.e., all
voters5 ° in the municipality)? (2) Is the problem the delegation of
legislative power to a limited group of property owners ?51 (3) Or is the
problem the standardless delegation of legislative power?
The Supreme Court upheld the Ohio procedure on the ground that a
referendum is not a delegation, but instead a direct exercise of "decisionmaking by the people, ' 5 2 a resort to "power reserved by the
people to themselves." 5 3 This avoids the necessity for dealing with the
questions just posed, but does not diminish their importance for lawyers who must live with the land use law articulated in these cases.
At stake in question (1) is the problem of scope-how many
persons must pass on a matter of land use in order to satisfy the
"standards" established by the Roberge line of cases? Is a general
plebiscite within the boundaries of the governing unit sufficient?
(Suffice it to suggest at this point, that if the block-level property
control condemned in Eubank were instead attempted through a
plebiscite of all residents (owners?)5 4 of a block-sized unit acting
pursuant to appropriate state constitutional and legislative authority, it
would likely be valid).55
The issue in question (2) is the problem of property-owner control,
or, as it was stated in Eubank, of "[o]ne set of owners determin[ing]
not only the extent of use but the kind of use which another set of
49. "Under Article II, § l(f) of the Ohio Constitution, municipal referendum powers
are limited to questions which municipalities are 'authorized by law to control by
legislative action.' " 41 Ohio St. 2d at 191, 324 N.E.2d at 744 (quoting Myers v.
Schiering, 27 Ohio St. 2d 11, 271 N.E.2d 864, 865 (1971)). See note 12 supra.
50. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
(1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
51. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (Poll tax held
unconstitutional) ("Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race
. , are traditionally disfavored.").
The language contained in footnote 12 of the majority opinion in Eastlake suggests,
in its interpretations of Cusack, that this may not be a problem. 426 U.S. at 774 n.12.
52. 426 U.S. at 678.
53. Id. at 675.
54. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (lElach . . . citizen has an
inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's
legislative bodies.").
55. Cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (involving a political unit
less than one square mile in size).
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owners may make of their property." 5 6 Is the referendum involving all
voters the only appropriate procedure, or may adjacent property owners in certain cases continue to control property on the authority of
Cusack as interpreted in Eastlake?
The problem in question (3) is, of course, that confronted by the
Ohio Supreme Court as it originally understood the operation of
Eastlake's ordinance:
The facts in the present case parallel those in Roberge. Here,
the city council of Eastlake . . . permitted the use of appellant's 8-acre parcel for multifamily high-rise apartments. But
before such ordinance and the use there allowed could become effective, appellant was required to obtain the consent
of 55 percent of Eastlake's voting public, in a mandatory
referendum. No standards were established whereby that action would be reasonable, rational and unarbitrary.58
When are standards required? The Federal Supreme Court's statement that they are not a part of the plebiscite 59 is only a partial answer.
For if the standardless delegation of power to a limited group of
property owners is an evil, then will the mere provision of standards
cure it? If so, what standards would be required? By holding out the
prospect of highly localized land use control, the Court encourages
legal innovation which is hardly in the public interest because it dilutes
property owners' rights and encourages segregation by race and income. 60 Cusack, if not stillborn, is now moribund and should have
been interred by the Eastlake court. 61 Instead, the substantial ambiguities inherent in the Eubank-Cusack-Roberge trilogy will, with the
Eastlake imprimatur, continue to haunt.those who try conscientiously
to formulate rational land use controls.
III.

EASTLAKE AND THE "NON-PROBLEM"

OF DELEGATION

In approving the Ohio referendum process, the Federal Supreme
Court looked to the Ohio constitutional provision 62 which "reserved"
the powers of initiative and referendum to the people. 63 The Court
56. 226 U.S. at 143.
57. 426 U.S. at 677-78 n. 12. See text accompanying note 48 supra. See also note 35

supra.
58. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 195-96, 324 N.E.2d at 746.

59. 426 U.S. at 675.
60. See 41 Ohio St. 2d at 199-201, 324 N.E.2d at 748-49 (Stern, J., concurring).
61. Some commentators see continued vitality for Cusack. See Payne, Delegation
Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government Law: The Case of ExclusionaryZoning, 29
RUTGERS L. REv. 803, 821 n.56 (1976).
62. OHIO CONST. art. II, § l(f). For the text of this provision, see note 12 supra.
63. 426 U.S. at 672 n.5.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:41

found that for purposes of federal constitutional law, a referendum
cannot be a delegation in violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 64 The Supreme Court had earlier upheld referendum voting on property issues in a prior Ohio case, Hunter v.
Erickson.65 In Hunter, the Court approved the use of referenda generally, 66 but invalidated an Akron law that subjected all ordinances
dealing with race and the transfer of property to referendum approval,
while excluding from its ambit all other provisions dealing with property. The Court found that this law denied the black petitioner equal
67
protection as it was an impermissible classification based on race.
In the view of the Eastlake Court, the problem presented by
delegation is the exercise of power by groups such as regulatory bodies
which are not responsive to the people. 68 Plebiscites arguably are
subject to similar problems. The example is suggested by Madison in
The FederalistNo. 39, cited by the Eastlake majority in support of the
proposition that governmental power is popularly derived.69 Madison
described republican government as that "which derives all its powers
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people."7 0 What is the
effect then of permitting less than the whole to exercise the power
broadly derived? If the delegation is from the legislature to a regulatory agency, then standards are required because popular checks are
absent. 7 ' But where Madison's "great body of the people" delegates
power to the legislature and at the same time permits it to be exercised
by smaller subgroups of the whole, e.g., citizens of municipalities or
other units of local government, then a delegation problem begins to
emerge.

72

It is not sufficient to suggest that abuses are correctable by the
popular power to amend constitutions or the implementing statutes.
Like the standardless regulatory body, unchecked by the popular will,
the municipality also has the potential to operate apart from the will
that called it into being and is thus arguably in need of standards to
guide it. 73 The Eastlake majority's singular emphasis on the referen64. Id. at 672. See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
65. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
66. Id.at 392.
67. Id.at 393.
68. 426 U.S. at 675.
69. Id.at 672.
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 206 (Smith ed. 1901); see also id. at 207.
71. 426 U.S. at 675.
72. See Elliott v. City of Clawson, 121 Mich. App. 363, 175 N.W.2d 821 (1970).
73. But see 426 U.S. at 675-76 n.10.
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dum qua direct political participation overlooks this "delegation aspect" of the operation of the Ohio constitutional scheme.
IV. EASTLAKE AND ZONING PROCEDURE
The primary concern of the dissents in Eastlake, and to a certain
extent the majority of the Ohio Supreme Court as well, was the
procedure followed in the referendum and its congruence with the
requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
Taken together, the dissenting Justices-Powell, Stevens and
Brennan-may be said to object to the Ohio zoning provision on
procedural grounds. In a one-paragraph dissent, Justice Powell rested
his objection on the inherent unfairness of the referendum procedure to
individual owners 74-- the problem of "spot zoning" via referendum.
This point will be examined in greater detail in Section VI below. The
dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan,
described the procedural problems with Eastlake in terms of two
issues:
(1) whether the procedure which a city employs in deciding to
grant or to deny a property owner's request for a change in
the zoning of his property must comply with the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) if so, whether
the procedure employed by the city of Eastlake is fundamentally fair?75
In urging the application of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment,7 6 Justice Stevens argued for a somewhat different position
than the majority's holding that a city-wide referendum satisfies the
requirements of procedural due process. 77 He insisted that the appropriate question under the due process clause is not simply that of
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 7 8-whether the end product of
74. Stated in full, Justice Powell's dissent is as follows:
There can be no doubt as to the propriety and legality of submitting generally applicable legislative questions, including zoning provisions, to a popular
referendum. But here the only issue concerned the status of a single small
parcel owned by a single "person." This procedure, affording no realistic
opportunity for the affected person to be heard, even by the electorate, is
fundamentally unfair. The "spot" referendum technique appears to open disquieting opportunities for local government bodies to bypass normal protective
procedures for resolving issues affecting individual rights.
426 U.S. at 680. The implications of Powell's objections to what may be seen as, (I)
narrow specific applications of the police power, (2) by plebiscite, and (3) without an
opportunity for a hearing, will be examined more fully in section VI, infra.
75. 426 U.S. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Le., "No State shall

. . .

deprive any person of.

process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
77. 426 U.S. at 672-73.
78. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

.

.property, without due
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a given zoning decision is arbitrary or capricious. 7 9 He also argued that
the Court should look beyond the unasserted position that the due
process clause does not apply at all (since petitioner is not denied "any
interest in property").8° Justice Stevens focused on what he saw as the
linchpin of the majority's analysis. He attacked their finding that the
Court must be bound by the Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion that
changes in the zoning classification of a specific parcel of land were
legislative in nature. 81 Instead, Justice Stevens would examine the
context of a given procedure to determine whether it is being used to
decide "questions of community policy.' '82 If so, then regardless of
the label applied for state law purposes, "the referendum would be an
acceptable procedure.' '83 By contrast, Justice Stevens viewed the
record in Eastlake as failing to show that any such public policy
interests were at issue, 84 so that the case simply involved the rights of a
single landowner and his neighbors, 85 the determination of which
Justice Stevens would treat as a judicial function for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment, requiring standards for the adjudication of
86
individual landowners' rights.
Proceeding from Justice Stevens' conclusion that state law determinations as to whether a given procedure is legislative or administrative ought not to control for purposes of the fourteenth amendment,
and given that the question at issue in the Eastlake referendum was not
shown to predominantly involve matters of public policy, it is still
necessary to consider whether the opportunity to seek a zoning reclassification is substantial enough to merit constitutional scrutiny under
the due process clause. This is so regardless of "whether that opportunity is denominated a privilege or a right." 7 It may now be taken for
79. 426 U.S. at 675, 675-76 n.10, 679 n.13.
80. Id. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 674 n.9. Indeed, it is not clear why, at least for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment, this state law determination should be binding on the Federal Supreme
Court. This is particularly true when, for purposes of that amendment, the Eastlake
majority rejected the Ohio Supreme Court's finding that the referendum provision was a
delegation of authority. Id. at 672.
82. Id. at 686, 693.
83. Id.
84. Id. Justice Stevens took issue with the majority's unsupported observation that
such issues might be involved. Id. at 688 n.10. See also id. at 673 n.7.
85. Id. at 693.
86. Id. at 693-94. On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court ignored the invitation of both
Justice Stevens and the majority to reconsider whether a legislative or administrative
function was involved. 48 Ohio St. 2d 47, 356 N.E.2d 499 (1976). See 426 U.S. at 674 n.9
(majority opinion), 692 (dissenting opinion).
87. 426 U.S. at 682.
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granted that the characterization of that opportunity as a "right" or
"privilege" will not affect its status vis-A-vis the due process clause. 88
What is important is whether zoning reclassification and the opportunity to seek it are "property" interests within the protection of the due
process clause, and this, at least in the first instance, is a question of
state zoning law:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must
have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance
that must not be arbitrarily undermined.

.

.

. It is a purpose

of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.
Property interests . . . are not created by the Constitu-

tion. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits
and that support claims of
89
entitlement to those benefits.
State law generally defines the entitlement to seek reclassification
of zoned land as a part of land ownership. Zoning is distinguished from
a taking, for which compensation would be required, (1) by its foundation in the police power, 90 and (2) by the mutuality of benefits and
burdens that fall alike upon the owners of zoned property. 9' Where
zoning imposes a hardship on the owner by precluding all reasonable
88. E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,571 (1972) ("T]he Court has fully
and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once
seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights."). See also id. at
571 n.9; 426 U.S. at 682. For an introduction to the subject predating the Court's current
clarification of the matter, see generally, Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinctionin ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
89. 408 U.S. at 577.
90. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
91. Not every restriction placed by authority of the state upon the use of
property for the general welfare of the state, without payment of compensation
constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law. . . . 'Compensation for such interference with and restriction in the use of property is
found in the share that the owner enjoys in the common benefit secured to all.'
Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 202, 5 N.E.2d 198, 200 (1936) (quoting
People ex rel. Wineburgh Advertising Co. v. Murphy, 195 N.Y. 126, 131, 88 N.E. 17, 19,
155 N.Y.S. 997, 999 (1909)). See also 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING 6-4 (4th ed. 1975).
For a criticism of the notion of zoning's impact on land and its limitations, see I N.
WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 7.03 (1974).
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use, the zoning regulation will be found to be a taking. 92 It is in the
mutual application of these principles that the entitlement to seek
reclassification emerges.
Most zoning statutes incorporate a means for granting "variances"
from the initial zoning scheme. 93 The immediate purpose of such
means is to avoid hardship:
The plain intent and purpose . . . is to permit . . . the
amelioration of the rigors of necessarily general zoning regulations by eliminating the necessity for a slavish adherence to
the precise letter of the regulations where, in a given case,
little or no good on the one side and undue hardship on the
other would result from a literal enforcement.94
Apart from this pragmatic end, however, there is also the thought that
the right to challenge individual zoning classifications is constitutionally mandated.9 5 The basis for this theory is that where a unit of local
government has established a police power interest for the zoniig
scheme, the property owner has no hope of releasing the government's
"griphold" on his property other than the opportunity to seek a
variance or similar change. 96 For these reasons the right to seek a
92. 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 91, at 6-5, 6-6. See also Nichols, Powers and Duties
of the Zoning Board of Adjustment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING,
ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 121 (1975). "Although the public interest may justify a
restriction on the use of property, it is also required that the owner of private property be
allowed a reasonable use of his property, or the zoning ordinance may be held unconstitutional as applied to specific property." Id. at 123 (citing cases from Georgia,
Maryland, Ohio, and Texas).
93. E.g., Puritan-Greenfield Improvement Ass'n v. Leo, 7 Mich. App. 659, 153
N.W.2d 162 (1967), (considering MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.585(d) (1958), which
states: "[W]here there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in the way of
carrying out the strict letter of the ordinance, the board of appeals [actually "the
legislative body of a city or village (acting) as a board of appeals," see MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 125.585(a) (1958)] shall have power. . . to vary or modify any of its rules,
regulations, or provisions . . . so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed,
public safety secured, and substantial justice done."). See also Green, The Power of the
Zoning Board of Adjustment to Grant VariancesFrom the Zoning Ordinance,29 N.C.L.
REV. 245 (1951); Reps, DiscretionaryPowers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 280 (1955); Note, Administrative Discretion in Zoning, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 668 (1969); Zoning Variances, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1396 (1961). For a discussion of
the current North Carolina decisions, see Brough, Flexibility Without Arbitrarinessin the
Zoning System: Observations on North CarolinaSpecial Exception and Zoning Amendment Cases, 53 N.C.L. REV. 925 (1975).
94. Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 111, 37 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1946). See
Puritan-Greenfield Improvement Ass'n v. Leo, 7 Mich. App. 659, 153 N.W.2d 162
(1967).
95. Bryden, Zoning: Rigid, Flexible, or Fluid?, 44 J. URB. L. 287, 295-96 (1967);
Zoning Variances, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1396 & n.5 (1961).
96. Biske v. City of Troy, 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969) (per curiam). The
term "griphold" is the court's. Id. at 457. Biske is discussed in I N. WILLIAMS, supra
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zoning reclassification or variance must be considered at least an
aspect of the right to possess and use real property, and thus cognizable
under the fourteenth amendment.
Given the significance of the right to seek a reclassification in
zoning, it is necessary to consider next the due process requirements
applicable to rezoning. The Ohio Supreme Court relied on an interpretation of due process in McGautha v. California. McGautha upheld
a California statute that permitted guilt and penalty to be determined in
two separate proceedings, and an Ohio statute permitting both guilt
and penalty to be considered in a single trial. The issue was whether
standards were required for the jury, and the majority held that the
absence of definitive standards did not violate the Constitution.
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Douglas
and Marshall, surveyed the judicial history of the requirement of
procedural safeguards. 98 Two portions of his survey were relied upon
by the Ohio Supreme Court:
[D]ue process requires that procedures for the exercise of
state power be structured in such a way that, ultimately at
least, fundamental choices among competing state policies
are resolved by a responsible organ of state government. 99
In my view, the cases discussed above establish. . . the
following propositions. First, due process of law requires the
States to protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of
state power by assuring that the fundamental policy choices
underlying any exercise of state power are explicitly articulated by some responsible organ of state government.l1°
Applied by the Ohio court to the municipal zoning process, Brennan's formulation would then require
[t]hat procedures for the exercise of municipal power be
structured such that fundamental choices among competing
municipal policies are resolved by a responsible organ of
government. It also requires that a municipality protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of municipal power, by
note 91, at § 6.08. See also Comment, Planningand Aesthetic Zoning-GettingMore Out
of What We've Got, 52 J. URB. L. 1033, 1047-50 (1975). Note that under Golden v.
Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972), the timing of that interest may be regulated without constitutional
difficulty. See also Nickola v. Township of Grand Blanc, 394 Mich. 589, 603-04, 232
N.W.2d 604, 608 (1975); Sabo v. Township of Monroe, 394 Mich. 531, 232 N.W.2d 584

(1975).
97. 402 U.S. at 248-312 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 248-71.
99. Id. at 256.
100. Id. at 270.
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assuring that fundamental policy choices underlying the exercise of that power are articulated by some responsible organ
of municipal government.' 0 1
The constitutional problem with plebiscite zoning when viewed
from this perspective is that it incorporates no mechanism for effectively putting the issue of reclassification before the voters in such a
way that the landowner can (1) tell his side of the story and (2)
determine whether the decision reached rests on more than whim or
caprice (i.e., is not arbitrary). 102 An inquiry under the Euclid standard
(or failure
as to the reasonableness of the result of the reclassification
10 3
to reclassify) avoids rather than resolves this problem.
The landowner is either left at the mercy of his community in
grossI° 4 or is forced to seek to tell his story in a larger forumasserting his "due process" through the election machinery. 10 5 Procedural fairness, however, has at least some application to the voting
process. 106 The greatest difficulty with recourse to plebiscite lies in its
potential for differential results based on wealth, which are constitutionally permissible under present law. 10 7 The landowner who has
greater funds can better carry his case to the electorate in order to
101. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d at 196, 324
N.E.2d at 746.
As of September, 1977, only one court outside Ohio had expressed approval of
Justice Brennan's formulation. See Andover Dev. Corp. v. New Smyrna Beach, 328 So.
2d 231, 237 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of
Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975), rev'd and remanded, 426 U.S. 668
(1976)). But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248 n. 11 (1972) ("The tension between
[Furman] . . .and McGautha highlights, in my view, the correctness of Mr. Justice
") (Douglas, J., concurring).
Brennan's dissent in that case [McGautha]..
102. 426 U.S. at 680-86. Williams explains the problem this way:
In religious terms, the sense of sin is totally lacking. The fourth period [of land
use control] reflects a sadder and a wiser mood. It is recognized that many
restrictions on developers' property rights are needed in the modern world, to
prevent development which will really harm neighbors or the environment
generally. But it is also recognized that local land use restrictions may also
serve a non-legitimate purpose, or indeed sometimes no real purpose at allthat is, they may be exclusionary in intent and/or effect, or merely the product
of a quite parochial vision, or sometimes unduly harsh with little compensating
public benefit-or merely inept.
I N. WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 110.
103. See 426 U.S. at 694-95 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. See Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928);
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
105. 426 U.S. at 675-76 n.10.
106. See generally, Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1111
(1975).
107. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). But cf.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (financial barriers limiting accessibility to the
courts violated due process).
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persuade them to approve a reclassification than can the impecunious
landowner." 8 From this problem arise a number of additional problems, involving the ability to take one's case to the electorate, which
are beyond the scope of this article.'09
A second, related problem is that, as a process, plebiscite zoning is
decidedly second-rate. In Eastlake, the majority likens the referendum
to a town meeting. "10 Both involve a legislative decision by voters on a
direct rather than a representative basis. There, however, the similarity
ends. Town meetings require an assembly of all voters who wish to
participate in one location at a given time; a referendum does not.
More importantly, town meetings involve discussions and alterations
of proposals-the give-and-take of the legislative process; a referendum is simply a vote. Finally, town meetings provide the opportunity
for equal access to the legislative ear; as already discussed, a referendum provides no such equality.
V.

PLEBISCITE ZONING AND THE PROBLEM OF
SUBSTANTIVE DuE PROCESS

Apart from the procedural difficulties of plebiscite zoning just
discussed, there is the further problem of judicial review of the "substantive results" of referendum decisionmaking. As noted above, the
applicable test is the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. I"'The problem with this standard is that
it frequently tests nothing. So much passes muster under this formulation, or its equal protection analogue, that one leading commentator
has called it "virtual judicial abdication"' 12 in the latter context.
In the typical case, when a zoning classification is attacked under
Euclid, the reviewing court will be able to consider how the challenged classification relates to the overall scheme adopted by the
municipality.1 3 Where the classification at issue has been made by a
formal legislative body, and not by referendum, the court may also be
aided by minutes, reports, and other legislative documents. These will
108. See Mark 4:25 ("For to him who has will more be given; and from him who has

not, even that which he has will be taken away.").
109. The immediate problem of deciding the validity of the Eastlake provision that

imposed election costs of the referendum on the landowner, was avoided on the state
level by a finding that the entire procedure was unconstitutional. 41 Ohio St. 2d at

188-89, 324 N.E.2d at 742. See 426 U.S. at 671 n.3.
110. 426 U.S. at 672-73.
111. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
112. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1972).
113. For a discussion of the requirement that a municipality have a zoning plan in
order to zone at all, see notes 121-29 infra and accompanying text.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:41

all help the court determine whether the classification under attack is
"arbitrary and capricious," or instead bears some rational relationship
to the municipality's recognized interest in protecting the health and
safety, as well as the overall quality of life of the community. 114 Even
where a town meeting is the legislative forum, there may be records of
the proceedings to help establish the purposes of the legislative act
under attack. However, where a reclassification is decided by municipal referendum, there is much less for the reviewing court to examine.
For example, in Forest City Enterprises' attempted reclassification, the
only evidence bearing on the reasonableness of the result arrived at by
the voters is the pre-existing scheme, because both the planning commission and the city council had advocated a change in the zoning of
the affected parcel. While this evidence is probably enough to sustain
the validity of voters' action in Eastlake,1l5 perhaps courts should
require more to sustain a substantive result where the process, even
though valid in terms of procedural due process, 116 provides less
assurance that the proposal was in fact considered in terms of valid
police power interests. 117
The problems of zoning-by-plebiscite are further exacerbated if
one takes Eastlake a step beyond its facts. Assume that initial zoning-not merely reclassification-is the subject of referendum. The
procedure is unchanged, and therefore it would satisfy procedural due
process requirements under Eastlake. The validity of the substantive
results of that process-the zoning classifications-presents greater
difficulties, however. Unless the voters act to approve or disapprove a
plan of zoning which subjects all property to zoning restrictions, there
is no articulated basis from which to find a reasonable regulation of
property rights, because there is neither a legislative record nor a
legislative scheme. In the case where zoning restrictions have been
imposed by referendum, without first implementing a plan, the only
rational bases for the restriction will be those supplied by the court.
Here again, one should query whether this is proper at all," 8 especially
where it is fatuous to assume that the plebiscite legislative "process"
of referendum-without-meeting involved such considerations.
114. E.g., Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
115. The Supreme Court did not decide the issue, but there is language in the case
suggesting that either "multi-family high rise" or "light industrial" would be a reasonable classification of Forest City Enterprises' property. 426 U.S. at 673 & n.7
(majority opinion), 686-88 & n.10 (dissenting opinion).
116. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
117. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
118. See GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 591-92 (9th ed.
1975).
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The problem of finding a basis for due process review of referendum zoning classifications leads to a subsidiary problem-the scope of
permissible judicial inquiry into legislative motivation in the absence
of some other indicia of purpose. 9 Since Fletcher v. Peck120 it has
been the rule that courts are loath to inquire into the motives of
legislators. In this respect, Eastlake presents the easy case. The city
already had a comprehensive zoning plan in effect, 2 1 which evidences
some measure of purpose. 122 As discussed above, however, the voters
in a plebiscite do not leave a record which will indicate a purpose. In
addition, although some courts have viewed the requirement of a
comprehensive zoning plan as essential to satisfying due process requirements, 12 others have not. 124 For example, in Raabe v. City of
Walker, 25 the Michigan Supreme Court found no master plan as
126
required by statute
save only as may be uncertainly implied from the city's original zoning ordinance or carried in the possibly variant
memories of city officials. Thus there is no record to which
one rightfully interested may turn for reliable comparison of
what may have been planned originally for Walker township
and Walker city, and thereafter effectuated to great
or less
127
extent, with any proposed amendatory enactment.
119. It should be emphasized that this inquiry relates solely to the search for a
legislative purpose against which to test a given legislative act. It should not be confused

with an inquiry into the presence or absence of standards with which to test the validity
of a procedure. As the Supreme Court noted, the latter inquiry has no relevance to
legislative procedures because "there is no more advance assurance that a legislative

body will act by conscientiously applying consistent standards than there is with respect
to voters." 426 U.S. at 675-76 n.10.
120. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130-31 (1810). See Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977).

121. 426 U.S. at 670.
122. See generally, Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 1154 (1955).
123. E.g., Speakman v. Mayor & Council, 8 N.J. 250, 256, 84 A.2d 715, 718 (1951).

See also Haar, supra note 122, at 1170-72. "Running through the various decisions
emphasizing forethought as the essence of comprehensiveness is the realization that only
an ordinance drawn with forethought can be a reasonable ordinance, and only a reasonable ordinance can hurdle the constitutional barriers of due process and equal
protection." Id. at 1171.
124. Haar, supra note 122, at 1157.
iThere appears to have been a judicial tendency to interpret the statutory
directive that zoning ordinances shall be "in accordance with a comprehensive
plan" as meaning nothing more than that zoning ordinances shall be comprehensive-that is to say, uniform and broad in scope of coverage. The lack, of a

master plan is deemed irrelevant to the validity of zoning measures.
Id.
125. 383 Mich. 165, 174 N.W.2d 789 (1970). The Court held that the property in

question could not be rezoned from "agricultural" to "heavy industrial."
126. MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 125.31 (1976).

127. 383 Mich. at 176, 174 N.W.2d at 795.
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Yet the absence of the plan was not fatal to the zoning scheme: "The
absence of a formally adopted municipal plan, whether mandated by
statute or not, does not of course invalidate municipal zoning or
rezoning. But it does . . . weaken substantially the well known

presumption which, ordinarily, attends any regular-on-its-face
...
128 The Connecmunicipal zoning ordinance or amendment.
ticut Supreme Court followed similar logic when it concluded: "The
town's comprehensive plan of zoning is to be found in the scheme of
the zoning regulations themselves, which are primarily concerned with
the use of property.' ' 129 It remains to be seen whether a zoning
"scheme" which arises out of the lesser legislative process of plebiscite zoning will be viewed as kindly when specific results are attacked
as arbitrary and capricious.
VI.

PLEBISCITES AND THE PROBLEM OF SPOT ZONING

Related to the problem just discussed of finding a proper legislative
purpose, is what Justice Powell saw as the problem of the " 'spot'
referendum technique."' 30 Spot zoning, as it is generally conceived of
in state law, arises from a zoning ordinance, or amendment thereto,
131
that creates a small area of inconsistent use within a larger zone.
Such inconsistency in the treatment of otherwise similar property
deprives the ordinance of its requisite relationship to the legitimate
exercise of police power.' 32 The inconsistency is demonstrated by a
factual showing that the property in question has been treated differently than other property, and that such treatment is not based on actual
differences in the property. Frequently, such special treatment subjects
the ordinance to an examination of its conformity with an overall
33
objective or comprehensive plan.'
But, as noted in the preceding section, a plan is not always
required. Where this is the case, what restraints are available to avoid
spot zoning resulting from a plebiscite? The easy answer urged
by the Eastlake Court is that any zoning result not up to Euclid
standards, i.e., not reasonably related to some legitimate police power
128. Id. at 178, 174 N.W.2d at 796. See also Sabo v. Township of Monroe, 394 Mich.
531, 232 N.E.2d 584 (1975). For a highly critical view of zoning decisions in the Michigan
courts, see 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 129.
129. Loh v. Town Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 32, 35, 282 A.2d 894, 896

(1971).
130. 426 U.S. at 680 (Powell, J.,dissenting).
131. E.g., Allgood v. Town of Tarboro, 281 N.C. 430, 189 S.E.2d 255 (1972); Penning
v. Owens, 340 Mich. 355, 65 N.W.2d 831 (1954).
132. E.g., McNutt Oil & Ref. Co. v. Brooks, 244 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
133. Orr v. Hapeville Realty Inv., 211 Ga. 235, 85 S.E.2d 20 (1954).

1977]

URBAN LAND USE

interest, will not stand.' 3 4 The limitations of this viewpoint have
already been discussed. 135 What is left is a slender reed of judicial
reluctance in some states to permit the extension of the plebiscite to
zoning matters. 136 The issues presented in such cases are either an
absence of authority to submit the zoning proposal to plebiscite 137
or
38
procedure.
zoning
on
provisions
statutory
general
with
conflicts
Other states have upheld plebiscite zoning. 139 The problem of spot
applications of the zoning power resulting from such a procedure is
134. 426 U.S. at 676.
135. See notes 104-30 supra and accompanying text.
136. For example, the use of initiative and referendum in zoning matters has been
disapproved in:
Arizona.
[W]e hold that the initiative process is not available as a mode for amending
a comprehensive zoning plan. It is an irreconcilable conflict with the due
process clause of the United States Constitution, 14th Amendment. See generally, Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 . . ., State of Washington ex
rel. Seattle Title & Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 . . . and the express
provisions of the state statute which delegated zoning powers to 'the governing
body of an incorporated city.'
City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 207-08,439 P.2d 290, 293-94 (1968).
California. Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Ass'n v. City Council of Laguna Beach, 187
Cal. App. 2d 448, 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1960); Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134,277
P. 308 (1929). But cf. Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal. App. 3d 463, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1972)
(upheld initiative zoning in a chartered city, as contrasted with the initiative of zoning
laws in general law cities, which were held invalid in the earlier line of cases). See
Comment, The Initiative and Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 74 (1976);
Comment, Zoning by Initiative to Satisfy Local Electorates: A Valid Approach in
California?, 10 CALIF. W.L. REV. 105 (1973).
Michigan. Korash v. City of Livonia, 38 Mich. App. 626, 196 N.W.2d 883 (1972);
Elliott v. City of Clawson, 21 Mich. App. 363, 175 N.W.2d 821 (1970).
Missouri. State v. Donohue, 368 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. 1963) (initiative).
Nebraska. Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956).
Nevada. Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts., Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234
(1974).
New Jersey. Smith v. Township of Livingston, 106 N.J. Super. 444, 256 A.2d 85
(1969).
Utah. Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964); Dewey v. Doxey-Layton
Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805 (1954).
137. E.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290 (1968)
(alternative holding).
138. E.g., Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Ass'n v. City Council of Laguna Beach, 187
Cal. App. 2d 448, 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1960).
139. For example, the use of initiative or referendum in zoning matters has been
approved in:
California. San Diego Bldg. Contr. Ass'n v. City Council of San Diego, 35 Cal. App.
3d 376, 110 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1974) (chartered cities only). See note 107 supra.
Colorado. City of Fort Collins v. Dooney, 178 Colo. 25, 496 P.2d 316 (1972).
Missouri. State v. Reim, 445 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1969) (referendum), cf. State v.
Donohue, 368 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. 1963) (initiative invalid).
Ohio. Hilltop Realty v. City of S. Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 164 N.E.2d 180
(1960); State v. Hitt, 155 Ohio St. 529, 99 N.E.2d 659 (1951).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:41

thus real and present in some states. Finally, in states such as North
Carolina, which lack general statutory plebiscite provisions, the difficulties are more remote, 1 0 but nonetheless likely, if popular pressure
for local land use control develops after the Eastlake decision.
VII.

ARLINGTON HEIGHTS AND ITS BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court did not invite a comparative examination of
Eastlake and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp. 141 That is not surprising. Read jointly, the cases
should trouble both those concerned with land use and those interested
in securing better housing for America's urban poor. 142 While Eastlake articulates the constitutional acceptability of the exclusivist mechanism of referendum zoning under the due process clause, Arlington
Heights limits constitutional inquiry into the racial impact of zoning
laws under equal protection principles.
In Arlington Heights, the Court had before it a claim that a failure
to rezone a fifteen-acre parcel in Arlington Heights, Illinois, from
single-family to multiple-family classification in order to permit the
140. Thus, despite the language of the North Carolina Constitution ("All political
power is vested in and derived from the people; all government of right originates from
the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the
whole." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 2.), political power is exercised by the General Assembly,
id. art. II, § 1, unless lawfully delegated, e.g., id. art. VII, § 1 (local government), and
even the constitutional amending process itself is under the strict control of the General
Assembly, id. art. XIII, § 1 ("No Convention of the People of this State shall ever be
called unless by the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each house of the
General Assembly, and unless the proposition 'Convention or No Convention' is first
submitted to the qualified voters of the State at the time and in the manner prescribed by
the General Assembly.") and § 2 ("The people of this State reserve the power to amend
this Constitution and to adopt a new or revised Constitution. This power may be
exercised by either of the methods set out hereinafter in this Article [Le., by Convention
pursuant to § I quoted supra, or by approval of three-fifths of the members of each
house of the General Assembly pursuant to § 4], but in no other way.") These provisions
contrast sharply with California's constitutional reservation of the powers of initiative
and referendum, CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 1; see Comment, The Scope of the Initiative and
Referendum in California, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1717 (1966), and Michigan's statutory
delegation of such powers, MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 117.4(i), 125.581-.591 (1976).
See Elliott v. City of Clawson, 21 Mich. App. 363, 175 N.W.2d 821 (1970) (this provision
was held not to extend to zoning). It will be interesting to see whether states lacking
plebiscite provisions will be encouraged by the Eastlake decision to adopt them.
141. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In fact, Arlington Heights makes no mention of Eastlake
which was decided less than a year earlier. Indeed, the majority opinion in Arlington
Heights refers to "the generous Euclid test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre," 429
U.S. at 263, rather than the more recent and extensive exposition of Euclid in Eastlake,
426 U.S. at 676.
142. See generally, Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §
1437(f) (Supp. V 1975). For a discussion of the housing problem, see United States v.
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
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construction of federally subsidized housing for low-and-moderate
income persons, was racially discriminatory and violative of the fourteenth amendment.
Events underlying the litigation began in 1970, when a religious
order in Arlington Heights decided to devote a portion of vacant land
that it owned there to low-and-moderate income housing. Minority
representation in Arlington Heights was scant: "According to the 1970
census, only 27 of the Village's 64,000 residents were black,"' 4 3 and
the religious leaders of the order sought to alter that pattern by making
additional federally subsidized housing available. They approached a
Chicago developer, Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
(MHDC), which had prior experience with federally assisted housing,
and ultimately entered into a lease/purchase agreement with MHDC
for the land. MHDC then applied to the Village of Arlington Heights
for rezoning of the fifteen-acre tract from a single-family to a multiplefamily classification. When that request was denied, MHDC and
certain potential minority tenants brought suit in federal district court
alleging that the denial was based on racial discrimination in violation
inter alia of the fourteenth amendment and the Fair Housing Act of
1968.' 4 The district court ruled against the plaintiffs, 45 and they
appealed. The Seventh Circuit reversed after finding that the "ultimate
effect" 1 46 of the denial was discrimination based on race in violation of
the fourteenth amendment.' 47 The Supreme Court reversed.
The principal issue was the appropriate test to apply to Arlington
Heights' refusal to rezone. The zoning classification was not (and
apparently could not be) attacked as unreasonable under due process
principles.' 48 Thus, the traditional test of rationality mandated by
Euclid, and reaffirmed in Belle Terre"49 and Eastlake,"'° was of no
help to MHDC and its fellow plaintiffs. What was needed was a basis
for utilizing a more exacting scrutiny. The court of appeals found that
such a basis existed under the equal protection clause.51 In arriving at
143. 429 U.S. at 255.
144.
145.
146.
147.

42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970).
373 F. Supp. 208 (1974).
517 F.2d 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 415.

148. 429 U.S. at 263. "[T]he heart of this litigation has never been the claim that the
Village's decision fails the generous Euclid test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre." Id.
See note 68 supra.
149. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
150. 426 U.S. at 676. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
151. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,
415 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd and remanded, 429 U.S. 252 (1976). For earlier cases in which
classifications based on race mandated strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause,
see Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
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that result, the Seventh Circuit first examined several earlier cases.
The court noted James v. Valtierra, 152 which involved a California
constitutional provision excluding low income housing that had not
first been approved at a community election. In Valtierra, those
eligible for low income housing argued that the general referendum
requirement was unconstitutional, but the Court held that mere disparity in impact on a given group did not require strict scrutiny. The Court
concluded that "a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal protection." 15 3 Interestingly, in
Valtierra, the decision whether or not to permit low income federal
housing was put to a referendum vote, foreshadowing the result postulated at the outset of this article. The court of appeals considered
Valtierra in passing judgment on Arlington Heights' failure to rezone.
It concluded that Valtierra had rejected the notion that racial disparity
154
alone meant racial discrimination.
The Seventh Circuit, however, accepted plaintiff's contention that
more than results must be considered when racial discrimination is
alleged. 155 Such an expanded inquiry was justified principally by
reliance on Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna. 156 The Seventh Circuit relied on Kennedy ParkHomes for the rule
that "[t]he impact of the Village's refusal to rezone 'must be assessed
not only in its immediate objective but its historical context and
ultimate effect.' "15' As applied by the court of appeals in Arlington
Heights, it resulted in a finding of "racially discriminatory ef184, 194 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). See also Tussman
and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 356 (1949).
152. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
153. Id.at 142.
154. "James [v. Valtierra] supports our analysis that racial disparity alone as it
relates to the housing project under consideration does not amount to racial discrimination." 517 F.2d at 413.
155. Id. Valtierra distinguished Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), which
rested on the conclusion that Akron's referendum law denied equal protection
by placing "special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process." . . . In Hunter the citizens of Akron had amended the city charter to
require that any ordinance regulating real estate on the basis of race, color,
religion, or national origin could not take effect without approval by a majority
of those voting in a city election. The Court held that the amendment created a
classification based upon race because it required that laws dealing with racial
housing matters could take effect only if they survived a mandatory referendum
while other housing ordinances took effect without any such special election.
402 U.S. 137, 140-41 (citation omitted). See also note 54 supra.
156. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
157. 517 F.2d at 413 (quoting Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna,
436 F.2d at 112). In Kennedy Park Homes, the ultimate effect of racial discrimination in
violation of the equal protection clause was found from various city actions including the
declaration of a moratorium on the development of new subdivisions shortly after steps
were taken to construct low income housing. See 436 F.2d at I l1.
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fects."' 58 Because of this, the court subjected the zoning decision to
strict constitutional scrutiny, so that it could be held valid only upon a
showing of "compelling public interest." 159 Judged against this standard, the ordinance was held invalid. Neither the policy "of maintaining the integrity of the zoning plan"" (permitting apartments only as
a buffer between commercial and residential areas) nor "protecting
neighborhood property values,' ' 16 1 the two bases for the ordinance
proffered by the Village, met this exacting standard. The Kennedy
ParkHomes rationale on which the court of appeals relied had been rejected, however, by the time Arlington Heights reached the Supreme
Court.
That rejection was made clear in Washington v. Davis,162 a case
which holds the key to Arlington Heights. In Washington, the Supreme Court concluded that the racially disproportionate impact of a
governmental act or decision, irrespective of the purpose behind it,
does not violate the equal protection component of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. 163 The subject of the action in Washington was a test of "verbal ability, vocabulary, reading and comprehension'' 164 required of those applying to be police officers with the
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department ("Test 21"). As
read by the Supreme Court, the court of appeals had held that a
showing of a disproportionate impact on black applicants was sufficient to "establish a constitutional violation, absent proof by petitioners that the test was an adequate measure of job performance in
addition to being an indicator of probable success in the training
program, a burden which the court ruled petitioners had failed to
discharge.' ' 165 The Supreme Court reversed and held that racially
disproportionate impact was not sufficient.
What is more pertinent to the Arlington Heights decision is a
passage from Washington in which several prior appellate-level decisions were noted and rejected. 166 The inclusion of Arlington Heights
158.
159.
160.
161.

517 F.2d at 415.
Id.
Id.
Id.

162. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977).
163. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Boiling extended to the federal government the disabilities placed on state discrimination by the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
164. 426 U.S. at 235.

165. Id. at 237. See Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 959-61,963 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
166. 426 U.S. at 244-45 & n.12.
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in this list foreshadowed its demise even before it was argued. 167 The
relevant portion of the opinion reads as follows:
Both before and after Palmer v. Thompson 681. . .various Courts of Appeals have held in several contexts. . . that
the substantially disproportionate racial impact of a statute or
official practice standing alone and without regard to discriminatory purpose, suffices to prove racial discrimination
violating the Equal Protection Clause absent some justification going substantially beyond what would be necessary to
validate most other legislative classifications. The cases impressively demonstrate that there is another side to the issue;.
but, with all due respect, to the extent that those cases rested
on or expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial
purpose is unnecessary in making out an equal protection
violation, we are in disagreement.' 6 9
The cases cited by the Court, with which it disagreed,' 70 included
Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna, 171 and
Arlington Heights. 172
The immediate question-whether Washington may be said to
invalidate these zoning cases-is most likely to be answered in the
affirmative. Four Justices joined Justice White in his majority opinion. 173 Only three Justices objected to the summary treatment of the
cases listed above. Justice Stevens stated: "Specifically, I express no
opinion on the merits of the cases listed in n. 12 of the Court's
opinion.' ' 74 And Justice Brennan, with Justice Marshall concurring,
stated in a dissenting opinion:
167. Washington was decided June 7, 1976. Arlington Heights was argued on Oct. 13,
1976.
168. 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (closing of five public swimming pools after a desegregation
decree could not be challenged as invidious on constitutional grounds). See generally
Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1,
26-29 (1976).
169. 426 U.S. at 244-45 (footnote omitted).
170. Id.at 244 n.12.
171. 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (zoning).
172. 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (zoning). Other cases in
the Court's list included Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d
Cir. 1968); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d
291 (9th Cir. 1970). See notes 5-11 supra and accompanying text.

173. Burger, C.J., Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, JJ. Justice Stevens joined inParts I
and IIof the opinion of the Court but filed a concurring opinion. See note 174 infra and
accompanying text.
174. 426 U.S. 254 n.* (Stevens, J., concurring). His caveat preceding this note is
likewise cautionary with respect to "overriding" the majority's rejection of impact
absent evidence of impermissible motivation:
[T]he line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not
nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's
opinion might assume. I agree, of course, that a constitutional issue does not
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arise every time some disproportionate impact is shown. On the other hand,
when the disproportion is as dramatic as in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
[(1960)] or Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 [(1886)] it really does not matter
whether' the standard is phrased in terms of purpose or effect. Therefore,
although I accept the staiement of the general rule in the Court's opinion, I am
not yet prepared to indicate how that standard should be applied in the many
cases which have formulated the governing standard in different language.
426 U.S. at 254.
Implicit in Justice Stevens' view is the concept of a threshold test for invidious
discrimination, so that up to a point, disproportionate impact is merely evidence of
impermissible motivation, but beyond that point it is conclusive on the issue and
motivation becomes irrelevant. In Gomillion, the legislative redrawing of the municipal
boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, excluded from the city all but four or five of some
400 Negro voters while not excluding any white voters or residents. This was held to
have deprived black voters of their right to vote in municipal elections on account of race
in violation of the fifteenth amendment. The Court did not require an inquiry into
motivation in order to invalidate the redrawing of the boundaries:
When a legislature . . . singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial
minority for special discriminatory treatment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment. In no case involving unequal weight in-voting distribution . . . did the
decision sanction a differentiation on racial lines whereby approval was given
to unequivocal withdrawal of the vote solely from colored citizens.
364 U.S. at 346.
In Yick Wo a facially neutral municipal ordinance -purporting to regulate laundries
was applied in such a way that two hundred two Chinese were not permitted to operate
laundries while eighty similarly situated non-Chinese were entitled to operate their
laundry businesses. The ordinance was held to violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. By contrast to Gomillion, the racial impact of the application of
the ordinance in Yick Wo was arguably only evidence of the equal protection infirmities
of the ordinance-the opportunity for the arbitrary exercise of governmental power
unguided by legislative guidelines among those similarly situated. This construction of
Yick Wo-what might be termed the original understanding of Yick Wo, (cf. Tussman
and tenBroek, supra note 151, at 342, 359 n.36)--is amply. supportable from the opinion
by Justice Matthews:
The power given. . .is not confided to their discretion in the legal sense of that
term, but is granted to their mere will. It is purely arbitrary, and acknowledges
neither guidance nor restraint.
The ordinance . . . does not prescribe a rule and conditions for the regulation of the use of property for laundry purposes, to which all similarly situated
may conform. It allows without restriction the use for such purposes of buildings of brick or stone; but, as to wooden buildings, constituting nearly all those
in previous use, it divides the owners or occupiers into two classes, not having
respect to their personal character and qualifications for the business, nor the
situation and nature and adaptation of the buildings themselves, but merely by
an arbitrary line, on one side of which are those who are permitted to pursue
their industry by the mere will and consent of the supervisors, and on the other
those from whom that consent is withheld, at their mere will and pleasure.
118 U.S. at 366-68. It is only after the formal development of this view of equal
protection that the Court turns to the evidence of its unequal application to Chinese
petitioners. Id. at 368.
The importance of this distinction between Yick Wo and Gomillion is clarified in
Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam, 336
U.S. 933 (1949), a case discussed later in the context of evidence required to show
discriminatory intent. See text accompanying note 186 infra. The Schnell court apparently interpreted Yick Wo as condemning the lodging of arbitrary discretion in a board:
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[I] feel constrained to comment upon the propriety of footnote 12. .

.

. One of the cases "disapproved"

therein is

presently scheduled for plenary consideration by the Court in
the 1976 Term. MetropolitanH.D. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (CA 7), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1030
(1975). If the Court regarded this case only a few months ago
as worthy of full briefing and argument, it ought not be
effectively reversed merely by its inclusion in a laundry list of
lower court decisions. 175
Given the statement of the majority (except Justice Stevens quoted
above), and because the dissenters speak of these cases as "disapproved" and "effectively reversed," and because Arlington Heights
was in fact reversed, it is difficult to contend that any of these cases
remain good law. Even if the demise of the zoning cases listed may not
be as serious as it appears at first blush, it will certainly hamper efforts
to provide housing opportunities for the urban poor of all races in
previously all-white suburbs. And even though it will not eliminate all
judicial scrutiny of exclusionary zoning policies, the undermining of
these cases has clearly narrowed the focus of possible legal attacks.
The Arlington Heights decision forces one to look to statutory and
state law solutions rather than federal Constitutional remedies for
exclusionary zoning. The availability of the Fair Housing Act of
1968176 should ameliorate the problem vis- -vis housing. This point
will be considered below in Section IX.
To state it even more plainly, the board, by the use of the words "understand
and explain [any article of the Federal Constitution]," is given the arbitrary
power to accept or reject any prospective elector that may apply, or, to use the
language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366 ....
"actually do confer,
not a discretion to be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of
each case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent."
81 F. Supp. at 878. In Schnell, the court had two sorts of evidence to consider-the
unequal application of the Boswell Amendment resulting in a disproportionate impact on
blacks seeking the franchise, and extrinsic evidence of impermissible motivation surrounding the adoption of the Boswell Amendment. Id. See text accompanying note 186
infra. The majority in Arlington Heights no doubt cited it for its latter point. See 429
U.S. at 267.
Problems arise only in attempting to reconcile Yick Wo and Gomillion. If, as Justice
Stevens suggested, there is a threshold test for invidious discrimination apart from
intent, then how does Yick Wo support it? Gomillion was decided under the fifteenth
amendment. Is a threshold test appropriate under fifteenth, but not under fourteenth
amendment cases where a motivation test is required? Language in Schnell suggests that
no different test applies under the respective amendments. 81 F. Supp. at 876; cf.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring) (would have
grounded the decision on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
rather than on the fifteenth amendment).
175. 426 U.S. at 257 n.1 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970). See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977); accord
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
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But alternative statutory remedies are not available for all the cases
summarily undercut by footnote twelve in Washington. This means
further civil rights legislation will be required to remedy the problems
pinpointed by those cases. Perhaps the best example of this is Hawkins
v. Town of Shaw, 177 which concerned disparities in the provision of
municipal services between black and white areas of Shaw, Mississippi-more specifically, differences in street paving, street lighting,
sanitary sewerage, surface water drainage, water mains, fire hydrants,
and traffic control signs. The Fifth Circuit found Shaw to be a town in
which "racial segregation is almost total." 17 8 Ninety-seven percent of
the black residents of the town lived in neighborhoods where there
were no white residents. The evidence before the court reflected a
distribution of city services that approximated the town's pattern of
79
racial segregation. 1
In Hawkins, the court of appeals examined the differences in
municipal services in terms of their impact on whites and blacks and,
finding no compelling state interest to justify them, concluded that
they violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Since there was no evidence of intent to discriminate, the case rests
entirely on an assessment of "the discriminatory results of Shaw's
administration of municipal services. "' 80 For this reason, it seems
clear that the rule of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights
would mandate a different result today. Yet there is no apparent
statutory analogy to the Fair Housing Act to cover the situation in
Hawkins. Without the ability to scrutinize results alone under the
fourteenth amendment, such discrimination will go unreviewed and
unremedied. 181
177. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).

178. Id. at 1288.
179. Ninety-seven percent of those in houses fronting on unpaved streets are black,

id. at 1289; no high-power, mercury vapor street lights were installed in black occupied
areas, id.; 99 percent of white residents, as compared to 80 percent of black residents,
were served by sanitary sewers, id. at 1290.
180. Id. at 1292.
181. It is easy to understand Justice Stevens' problem with the summary treatment of

the cases listed by the majority, 426 U.S. at 244 n.12, and his express reservation of
opinion on the merits of those cases. Id. at 254 & n.*. The facts in Hawkins closely

approximate those in Yick Wo and certainly Gomillion. As Justice Stevens noted, the
line between intent and impact is frequently blurred, and statistical and other evidence

becomes an effective indication of intent. The real difficulty in reconciling the standards
laid down in the majority opinion with the disapproved cases in footnote 12 is illustrated
by Hawkins. In Arlington Heights, the Court says: "Absent a pattern as stark as that in
Gomillion or Yick Wo [cases in which 'the evidentiary inquiry is. . .relatively easy'
apparently since the 'statistical pattern[s]' are ones of 'extremes,' 429 U.S. at 266 &

n.13], impact alone is not determinative." Id. at 266. But what is the evidence in
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TESTS FOR DISCRIMINATION IN ARLINGTON HEIGHTS

Arlington Heights sets forth a partial' 8 2 series of "evidentiary
sources" by which racially discriminatory intent or purpose may be
detected: (1) the "historical background of the decision"; (2) "[t]he
specific sequence of events leading up to the . . . decision"; (3)

"[d]epartures
from the normal procedural sequence"; (4)
"[s]ubstantive departures" (i.e., a decision contrary to the facts normally weighed by the decision-maker) and (5) "legislative or administrative history."' 83 The application of these tests, as the following
discussion demonstrates, is not easy; nor does it always clarify the
existence or absence of impermissible motivation.
A. "HistoricalBackground"
The first test, historical background, is illustrated by three cases
which reveal "a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes." They are Lane v. Wilson,' 84 Griffin v. County School
Board,185 and Davis v. Schnell. 186 The Lane case attacked discrimination in voting rights under the fifteenth amendment. Oklahoma had
enacted a literacy test for voters from which white persons were
exempt by virtue of a "grandfather clause." This test was held to
violate the fifteenth amendment in Guinn v. United States. 187 Oklahoma had meanwhile held an election under the provisions of the law
embodying the literacy test. A new registration law, replacing the one
struck down in Guinn, provided that all who had voted in the 1914
election would remain qualified to vote, while those otherwise qualified who were previously excluded would have twelve days within
which to register (from April 30, 1916 to May 11, 1916), after which
time they would be perpetually disenfranchised. Since the new law
passed in 1916 had the effect of locking in the results of the registration
pattern of 1914, which was itself based on an unconstitutional scheme,
Hawkins if not extreme? And what would be required, apart from evidence of intent to
make it square with Yick Wo and Gomillion on whose authority it is still apparently

possible either to (I) infer intent from extreme, racially disproportionate impact or (2)
weigh state actions on equal protection grounds without resort to intent? The summary
inclusion of Hawkins in the disapproved cases would appear to be a source of additional
difficulty in understanding the Washington and Arlington Heights rule on impact and in

deciding when one is required to consider the rule.
182. 429 U.S. at 268.
183. Id. at 267-68.
184. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
185. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
186. 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933
(1949).

187. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
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the Court found the new law disenfranchising black voters similarly
infirm. As the Lane Court concluded, historical background indicates
invidious purpose, "[the Act of 1916] was obviously directed towards
the consequences of the decision in Guinn. . . . 188 The lesson of
history in Lane is clear. It is likewise so in Griffin, the next case
pointed to by the Court.
Griffin traced the history of Prince Edward County, Virginia's
response to the desegregation mandate of Brown v. Board of Education.I89 The county refused to appropriate funds for public schools,
and instead made tuition grants and tax credits available for white-only
private schools. This practice was held to violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The role of history in Griffin
seems clear enough, but Griffin and the earlier case of Gomillion v.
Lightfoot were both construed and limited in the later case of Palmer
v. Thompson, 190 which upheld the closing of five public swimming
pools in the face of a desegregation order. According to the Palmer
Court:
It is true there is language in some of our cases interpreting
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments which may suggest that the motive or purpose behind a law is relevant to its
constitutionality [citing Griffin and Gomillion]. But the focus
in those cases was on the actual effect of the enactments, not
upon the motivation which led the States to behave as they
did. In Griffin . . . the State was in fact perpetuating a
segregated public school system by financing segregated "private" academies. And in Gomillion the Alabama legislature's
gerrymander of the boundaries of Tuskegee excluded virtually all Negroes from voting in town elections. Here the record
indicates only that Jackson once ran segregated public swimming pools and that no public pools are now maintained by
the city.' 9 '
In Schnell a three-judge federal court invalidated an Alabama
literacy requirement (the Boswell Amendment) that permitted a board
of registrars to judge whether an applicant for the franchise could
" 'understand and explain' any article of the United States Constitution. .. . 92 The district court found that the registrars had, in their
legislatively unguided discretion, applied the standard to the detriment
188. 307 U.S. at 270-71.
189. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
190. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).

191. Id. at 225. Griffin is, of course, distinguishable, as Palmer indicates, if the
constitutional infirmity is not closing public schools per se but supporting private
segregated schools at the same time.
192. 81 F. Supp. at 874.
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of black applicants: "The evidence shows that during the incumbency
of the defendant board that more than 2800 white persons have been
registered and approximately 104 Negroes. The estimated population
of Mobile County is 230,000 of which approximately 64 per cent is
white and 36 per cent is colored."1 93 Thus far Schnell itself appears to
be an "ultimate effects" case.' 94 But the district court went on to
consider the legislative history and other evidence of the invidious
purpose surrounding the adoption of the Boswell Amendment,1 95 and it
is this historical background and not the disparity in application alone
that identifies the racial basis of the Alabama law in Schnell.
The contrary pull of Arlington Heights and Palmerv. Thompson is
striking. On the one hand, the court would require inquiry into historical background in order to infer invidious purpose from official
actions (Arlington Heights), and on the other hand would confine the
scrutiny to "the actual effect of enactments" in disregard of illicit
motivation 196 (Palmer)-an approach condemned outright in Washington v. Davis. The Court in Arlington Heights alluded to the
problematic language in Palmer 197 but did not reconcile the various
positions the Court has taken.
B.

"Specific Sequence of Events"

As its second evidentiary source, the Arlington Heights majority
looked to "[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the...
decision."' 198 The Court cites Reitman v. Mulkey,'" a case that ex193. Id. at 876.
194. See note 174 supra.
195. 81 F. Supp. at 878-80.
196. It is difficult or impossible for any court to determine the "sole" or "dominant" motivation behind the choices of a group of legislators. Furthermore,
there is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of
the bad motives of its supporters. If the law is struck down for this reason,
rather than because of its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid
as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for different
reasons.
403 U.S. at 225; cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977):
The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially
where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking
body, minutes of its meetings, or reports. In some extraordinary instances the
members might be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose
of the official action.
Id. at 268. But see Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); 429 U.S. at 268 n.18;
note 109 supra.
197. "Although some contrary indications may be drawn from some of our cases
" 429..
U.S. at 265 & n. 10 (citing interaliaPalmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,225).
198. 429 U.S. at 267.
199. 387 U.S. 369, 373-76 (1967).
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amined the history of the adoption of California's Proposition 1420O
which was designed to eliminate state restrictions on the right of
private persons to discriminate. The Court also relied on Grosjean v.
American Press Co. ,201 which invalidated a Louisiana tax on gross
receipts of publishing firms having a publication with a circulation of
more than 20,000 copies per week. Such reliance is puzzling because
in Grosjean the Court considered the history and circumstances surrounding the adoption of the first amendment 20 2 and also noted the
Louisiana tax to be the first of its kind imposed by a state. 20 3 It is
difficult to see how this illustrates a sequence demonstrating improper
motive on the part of the Louisiana legislature-and more particularly
motivation analogous to that involved in racially based discrimination.
A hypothetical example provided by the Court as a counterpoint to
Arlington Heights is more helpful: "[I]f the property involved here
always had been zoned R-5 but suddenly was changed to R-3 when
the town learned of MHDC's plans to erect integrated housing, we
would have a far different case.''204 Both the hypothetical and 2the
°5
cases cited by the Court-ProgressDevelopment Corp. v. Mitchell
and Kennedy Park Homes Association, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna 2 t -- show sudden changes in land regulation to forestall integration.
This evidentiary test of motivation has the advantage of being easier to
prove for one challenging zoning as improper, but it does nothing for
the plaintiff seeking to challenge those who have long since put their
racially exclusive neighborhood together. Communities like Arlington
Heights are rewarded under this test for long-standing patterns of
exclusivity. A possible approach to this hurdle, consistent with the
"sequence of events" test, would be to look at the degree to which
now-impermissible private restraints on alienation, e.g., enforcement
of restrictive covenants excluding persons of a designated race or color
from the use or occupancy of residential real estate held invalid in
200. Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires
to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease
or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion,

chooses.
Id. at 371.
201. 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
202. Id. at 245-50.
203. Id. at 250-51.

204. 429 U.S. at 267.
205. 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961). See 429 U.S. at 266 n.16.
206. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). The Court was
careful to note that it cited this case only as an example of a sequence of events

reflecting improper motivation and not as an approval of the grounding of the case on
discriminatory impact alone.
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Shelley v. Kraemer,20 7 worked in tandem in the past with facially
neutral zoning regulations to create a suspect result analogous to that in
Guinn and Lane.
C.

"Departuresfrom the Normal ProceduralSequence"
In its third test the Court attached evidentiary significance to
procedural irregularities by municipal bodies. By so doing, the Court
set an evaluative task for lower courts that has largely been avoided in
the past. Thus, although courts have purported to honor procedural
regularity as a touchstone of proper legislative conduct,20 8 they have
generally presumed that meetings are regular and valid.20 9 Unlike the
other four tests discussed by the Court, no case law is cited to indicate
how this test should be applied. Procedure in this sense, as a part of
"such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available," '2 10 should probably not be limited merely to legislative or
administrative procedure. Rather, it should be understood broadly, to
embrace the whole range of "municipal demeanor." For example, in
Amen v. City of Dearborn,211 the district court found that the city
violated the due process rights of the plaintiff property owners in an
ethnic area sought by the city as an industrial site. In its acquisition
process, the city was found to have misused its powers to issue
building and occupancy permits, and itself contributed to the pollution
of the area by selling sites to brick and asphalt manufacturers, posting
signs encouraging vandalism, and by other similar oppressive acts
which forced property owners to sell to the city at a depressed price.
This conduct amounted to a taking of property without compensation.
In electing to pursue oppressive acquisition practices in place of
condemnation or mere purchase, the city's acts could be fairly construed as a deviation from normal procedural sequence. Similar results
2 12
have been reached in other cases of oppressive acquisition practice.
207. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
208. E.g., Swindell v. State, 143 Ind. 153, 42 N.E. 528 (1895).
209. E.g., Board of Supervisors v. Judges, 106 Mich. 166, 64 N.W. 42 (1895); 7 E.
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 13.37d (3d ed. 1968).
210. 429 U.S. at 266.
211. 363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.
1976). Amen was remanded for additional factfinding on the issues of jurisdiction over
(1) the parties and (2) the subject matter of the dispute.
212. E.g., Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Mich. 1970);
Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th
Cir. 1968).
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D.

"Substantive Departures"

The evidentiary standard of "substantive departures" referred to
decisions which are unreasonable or are substantially contrary to the
facts considered by the legislative or administrative body. By this
measure, where race is a factor, instances of zoning which presumably
approach the limits of Euclid's reasonableness tolerance become evidence of impermissible motivation.2 13 For instance, in the case cited
by the Arlington Heights majority-Dailey v. City of Lawton 21a-the
Tenth Circuit upheld a district court finding "of racial motivation and
of arbitrary and unreasonable action in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and of § 1983, ' ' 2'5 and awarded injunctive relief. The
ruling was based on evidence that the area for which rezoning was
sought for high density residential use-in order to permit the construction of low-income housing-was itself surrounded by land similarly zoned. The bases which the city offered for refusing to rezone,
i.e., overcrowding of the neighborhood, the schools, and the recreational facilities, and overburdening of the fire fighting capabilities,
216
were essentially unsupported by evidence.
The facts in the Dailey case do not point solely to "substantive
departures" which identify racial motivation. For although the court of
appeals found that the justifications relied on were without foundation,
it also found direct evidence of racial prejudice. That is to say, Dailey
is not a simple instance in which race was implicated and no support
existed for actions affecting minorities. It was rather an instance where
other evidence of invidious racial motivation was available:
The [proposed] housing project is designed to serve lowincome groups which consist of Negroes, Spanish-Americans, and poor whites. The signers of the petitions in opposition [to the project] were all white. The racial situation was
discussed in connection with the circulation of the petitions.
The project sponsors received numerous anonymous phone
calls which opposed the project on a racial basis. The one
dissenting member of the Planning Commission testified that
the opposition was based on racial bias. The evidence is
sufficient to show that the public bodies acted as they did
because of the opposition
to the project by the residents of
217
the North Addition.
213. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of spot zoning, see note 125

supra and accompanying text.
214. 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
215. Id. at 1040.

216. Id. at 1039.
217. Id.
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Not only was direct evidence of improper motive present in
Dailey, but the only defenses to the allegation of racism were the
unsupported alternative bases offered by the city. After the endorsement of the Dailey test, it is difficult to imagine that, in the future, a
community bent on racial exclusivity would fail to fill the record with
support for racially neutral reasons for zoning out low income integrated housing. Sophisticated discrimination would seem difficult to
detect by the Dailey test of "substantive departures" as it is posited in
Arlington Heights.
E.

"Legislative or Administrative History"

The last evidentiary test set out by the Court-legislative or administrative history-is the most problematic. Yet, the Court did not
dodge this difficulty. Because the test may encourage attempts to
examine members of decision-making bodies, the opinion mentioned
the problem of privilege, 218 citing Tenney v. Brandhove,2 19 United

22 1
States v. Nixon, 220 and Wigmore's treatise.
The issue of immunity and privilege is likely to take directions not
immediately evident from Tenney, a case involving the alleged abuse
of the immunity for legislators performing legislative functions, or
from the Nixon tapes case. Although some officials may be able to lay
claim to the privilege delineated in these cases and in Wigmore's
commentary, local officials involved in zoning will likely be subject to
a more searching inquiry. That search for evidence would probably
arise in an action for improper conduct under the Civil Rights Act.
Tenney represents the immune, privileged side of the liability spectrum of officials subject to suit. Officials who make zoning decisions
222
are, however, subject to the more recent rule of Wood v. Strickland
in which the Court held school board members personally liable for
violations of students' constitutional rights. The prospect of a collateral action, asserting liability as a natural component of most legal
efforts aimed at seeking evidence of improper racial motivation, would
seem likely. That liability could be personal under the Civil Rights Act

218. 429 U.S. at 268.
219. 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (traditional immunity of state legislators from civil liability
for acts done within the sphere of legislative action unaffected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970)). See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (common law doctrine of judicial
immunity is unaffected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
220. 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (presidential privilege under article II).
221. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2371 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (testimonial privilege
of executive and subordinate government officers).
222. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See Hogue, Board Member and Administrator Liability
Since Wood v. Strickland, 7 SCH. L. BULL. I (Oct. 1976).
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of 1871223 as in Wood, or it could be corporate, naming the city,
zoning board, or similar entity as a defendant.2 24
There is another major problem posed by this evidentiary test, and
that is the degree of interference with legislators and administrators:
"In some extraordinary instances the members might be called to the
stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official action. .. 22 This difficulty is resolved in a footnote.22 6 Yet the
problem goes to the heart of the doctrine of separation of powers
among the three coequal branches of government-a principle as
important in state constitutional law 227 as in federal law. 228 The problem is as old as Fletcher v. Peck, 229 and the authorities cited by the
Court discuss but do not resolve the extent to which this doctrine may
limit judicial inquiry into the legislative or administrative acts of local
officials.
These four evidentiary tests of discriminatory intent are admittedly
difficult to administer and in some cases difficult even to define with
precision. Unlike the test of "ultimate effects" rejected in Washington
v. Davis and Arlington Heights, they will make the detection and
redress of racially restrictive zoning decisions more difficult.
There is, however, some hope remaining for America's urban
poor. It lies principally in the Fair Housing Act of 1968230 and in state
23 1
constitutional law approaches to the problem.

IX.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN BATTLING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING

Arlington Heights was reversed and remanded for consideration of
the plaintiffs' claim that the city's refusal to rezone violated the Fair
Housing Act of 1968.232 This claim, unlike the constitutional one
223. 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).

224. Hogue, supra note 222, at 9 n.58. See also Hundt, Suing MunicipalitiesDirectly
Under the FourteenthAmendment, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 770 (1975); Note, DamageRemedies Against Municipalitiesfor ConstitutionalViolations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922 (1976).
225. 429 U.S. at 268.
226. Id. at 268 n.18.
227. E.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6: "The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial
powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other."

See also Note, Administrative Law-Judicial Review and Separation of Powers, 45
N.C.L. REV. 467 (1967).

228. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
229. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See notes 109, 189 supra.
230. Title VIII (Fair Housing) Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970).
231. E.g. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975). See Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local

Government Law: The Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 803, 805-21
(1976).
232. 429 U.S. at 271.
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which received such short shrift, will likely be tested by a more
generous standard 2 3 3-the very test that plaintiffs sought unsuccessfully to apply to the fourteenth amendment. Indeed, just as Washington v.
Davis may be viewed as a failure to engraft the statutory standards of
234
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 onto the fifth amendment,
so Arlington Heights represented a failure to impose the standards of
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 on the fourteenth amendment.
The burden of proof under Title VIII, the Fair Housing Act, is
235
stated in United States v. City of Black Jack:
To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the
plaintiff need prove no more than that the conduct of the
defendant actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other words, that it has a discriminatory ef236
fect ....
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case by
demonstrating racially discriminatory effect, the burden
shifts to the governmental defendant to demonstrate that its
conduct was23 7necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.
In Black Jack, the Eighth Circuit found that a city ordinance
prohibiting the construction of any new multiple-family dwellings, and
making present ones nonconforming uses, did result in discrimination
and that the interests urged by the city-inter alia, road and traffic
control, prevention of overcrowding of schools, and the prevention of
devaluation of adjacent single-family homes--did not demonstrate a
compelling governmental interest. The analogy to Arlington Heights
is striking-the court of appeals in Arlington Heights found a dis233. It must be conceded, however, that after Washington and Arlington Heights it
remains an open question whether Congress has the power under section five of the
fourteenth amendment to authorize the imposition of sanctions upon an evidentiary
showing which is less rigorous than that required by section one of the amendment. See

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
234. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970)
(Equal Employment Opportunity Act).
Although appellants' complaint did not allege a violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which then was inapplicable to the Federal Government,
decisions applying Title VII furnish additional instruction as to the legal standard governing the issues raised in this case. . . . The many decisions disposing of employment discrimination claims on constitutional grounds have made
no distinction between the constitutional standard and the statutory standard
under Title VIII.
512 F.2d at 956 n.2, quoted in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 236-37 n.6. Washington
held this test to be erroneously applied. 426 U.S. at 238. The application of Title VII is
explained in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
235. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
236. Id. at 1184.
237. Id. at 1185.
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criminatory effect 2 38 and further concluded that the city's justification,
i.e., maintaining the integrity of its zoning plan through a buffer
policy that permitted multi-family housing only as a transition between
single-family zoning and commercial or industrial areas, was inadequate. 239 The result in Arlington Heights on remand would appear to
follow directly from Black Jack. Of some interest will be the effect, if
any, of the apparent distinction between the cases. The City of Black
Jack took its discriminatory step with some forethought2 4° while Arlington Heights did not. Under the tests set out in Black Jack, this
should have no importance, although it would under the "sequence of
events" test for the fourteenth amendment under ArlingtonHeights .241
In addition to the federal statutory remedy for discrimination just
discussed, state constitutional law may also afford a remedy in certain
instances. For example, in Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel,242 the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that a restrictive zoning ordinance prescribing minimum lot area and
frontage, minimum building size, and bedroom restrictions which prevented altogether the construction of low-and-moderate income housing and multi-family dwellings, violated the "state constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal protection . . 243
The provision of adequate housing was seen as "an absolute essential
in promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use
regulation."244 As explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court, once
it is shown that a developing community has not adequately provided
for diversity in its available housing so as to meet the needs of lowand-moderate income persons, there is a prima facie violation of
substantive due process and equal protection. At this point, "the
burden, and it is a heavy one, shifts to the municipality to establish a
245
valid basis for its action or non-action."
238. 517 F.2d at 413-14.

239. Id.at 415.
240. The Black Jack ordinance was adopted in 1970 in response to a proposal to build

low-and-moderate income housing that began in 1969: "Within a month, the proposal
became a matter of public knowledge, and public opposition was swift and active." 508

F.2d at 1182.
241. 429 U.S. at 267. See note 191 supra.
242. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975). See Brennan, State Constitutions and the

Protectionof IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 501 (1977). For a review of recent
literature on Mount Laurel, see Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local
Government Law: The Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 803, 807 n.21
(1976). The result in Mount Laurel was reaffirmed in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v.
Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
243. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725.

244. Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727.
245. Id. at 181, 336 A.2d at 728.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:41

The result in Mount Laurel is appealing, but the substantive due
process ground which the court unabashedly adopted will offend
many. For example, one commentator has argued:
No matter how sympathetic one may be to the societal vision
conjured by Justice Hall in Mount Laurel, I submit that the
decision thrusts the courts into a substantive policy-making
role so far beyond the range of judicial skill and political
tolerance that the promise of Mount Laurel begins to look
like a cruel hoax.246
Substantive due process has been a perennial thorn in the flesh at the
federal level,247 but state courts have traditionally been more tolerant
of it. 248 And although many states do not face the precise problems
confronting the low-to-middle income shelter seeker in Mount
Laurel, 24 9 it is worth noting that other states do have the judicial
material out of which Mount Laurel alchemistically emerged.
Perhaps of most interest with respect to Mount Laurel is that it
does not require a race-based analysis to reach its result. The court
found that "the regulatory scheme was not adopted with any desire or
intent to exclude prospective residents on the obviously illegal bases of
race, origin or believed social incompatibility." 250 Thus, the case
would not have succeeded under the intent standard of Arlington
Heights. The housing focus in the case makes it an attractive alternative to the Fair Housing Act in circumstances where an adequate
showing of racial impact is not possible.
In the wake of recent decisions such as Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas,251 Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,252 Con246. Payne, supra note 242, at 808. Payne offers an alternative ground for the
decision in Mount Laurel, i.e., as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to
local governments. He argues in favor of a new understanding of delegation as "lateral"
from the legislature to a unit at the same level of government and "hierarchical" to
subordinate units of government such as a municipal corporation. The nomenclature is
his own. Id. at 821-22.
247. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159; McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme
Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34. See also Tushnet, The

Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT.
REV. 261, 277-86.

248. E.g., Inre Aston Park Hospital, Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973). See
Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process inthe States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91
(1950); Note, Hospital Regulation After Aston Park: Substantive Due Process in North
Carolina, 52 N.C.L. REV. 763 (1974); Comment, Substantive Due Process in the States
Revisited, 18 OHIo ST. L.J. 384 (1957).
249. See generally 67 N.J. 151, 161-73, 336 A.2d 713, 718-24.

250. Id.at 159, 336 A.2d at 717.
251. 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (The Court upheld a restriction of land use to one-family
dwellings excluding lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple-
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struction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 253 and Arlington Heights, it is comforting to note that legal
mechanisms to provide housing for the poor have not been wholly
foreclosed.
X.

CONCLUSION

As has been shown in the preceding section, Arlington Heights
does not signify the end of housing remedies for the poor; however, it
will necessitate a shift in the legal bases for asserting housing claims.
The elimination of judicial inquiry into the racial impact of zoning will
force housing litigators to seek relief via state constitutional claims and
statutory remedies. What remains uncertain is whether the legislature
will act to fill the gaps left by the state constitutional claims and the
existing statutory remedies.
Most disturbing is the total result brought about by Eastlake and
Arlington Heights. In concert they effectively preclude most federal
constitutional attacks against discriminatory land use regulation.
Municipalities are now apparently free to enact plebiscite zoning
provisions (assuming they are authorized to do so under state law) and
to insulate such rezoning from federal constitutional attack. Unless
such plebiscite provisions, can themselves be shown to violate overtly
either due process or the now tougher requirements of equal protection,25 4 the results flowing from those referenda will be substantially
more difficult to attack.
dwelling houses where a family is defined by ordinance to mean one or more persons
related by blood, adoption or marriage, or no more than two persons not so related but
living as a single housekeeping unit: "A quiet place where yards are wide, people few,

and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to
family needs." Id. at 9.
252. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.

1003 (1972) (residential restrictions based on an 18-year capital plan which would delay
development for close to 18 years held constitutional).
253. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) (housing development growth rate fixed at 500 dwelling units

per year not unreasonable).
254. E.g., Hunter v. Erikson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (charter amendment requirmng a

validating referendum only for ordinances which regulated land use on the basis of race
held to violate equal protection). See also note 155 supra.

